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Abstract Nicolopoulou and Weintraub (1996) raised doubts
about the extent of the relevance of the Humboldtian tradition for
Vygotsky's concept of culture, and his semiotic approach in
general. However, these doubts are unfounded—Vygotsky was
in direct contact with the 19th-century German traditions of
philosophical analyses of language/ as well as with their Russian
j: elaborations. Furthermore, Vygotsky borrowed theoretical
f notions from two distinct traditions of thought—often contrasted
(by Soviet sources) as 'idealist' and 'materialist.' Defying the
demand to make such contrasts mutually exclusive, Vygotsky
tried to blend productive moments from each of them into his
approach. He was not a 'cultural relativist7 in the sense of
present-day North American social discourse. It is suggested that
the concepts of development and relativism are in need of further
elaboration, in ways that allow recognition of local progress
while avoiding global claims where the bases of comparison are
not made explicit.
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The commentary by Nicolopoulou and Weintraub (1996) and my
present reply demonstrate Humboldt's and Potebnya's contention that
we understand ourselves only after we have tested our words on the
social other. Perhaps the more gloomy conclusion is that in the end
what is said never coincides with what is comprehended, and the
understanding that there is an inescapable gap between speaker and
listener also holds true for written texts (Kozulin, 1990, pp. 19-20; Van
der Veer, 1996).
It would seem that the writing (and rewriting) process, with its
constant mental dialogue with imaginary readers who need to
understand and agree with the text, would guarantee that the writer
fully understands (the implications of) his or her own text. What is
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more, unlike the spoken word, a written text is available as an object
for study and understanding by its author. And yet the creative reader
gives his or her own original twist to the ideas embodied in a text and
thereby derives implications and corollaries unexpected and/or
unintended by its author. Written texts differ fundamentally from oral
speech but do not escape Humboldt's (1826/1971) laws.
Nicolopoulou and Weintraub display an exquisite understanding of
this troublesome but creative facet of human discourse. Their text is
full of expressions which show their deep understanding of the pitfalls
and subtleties of human dialogue. It is clear, for example, that their use
of expressions such as 'Van der Veer suggests, or so it appears' and
'without quite saying so directly, Van der Veer seems to imply1 (p. 275;
emphasis added) is not meant to suggest that my own original text was
fundamentally ambiguous but demonstrates an awareness of the fact
that each statement (whether scientific or otherwise) is in need of
interpretation and is changed in that process of interpretation. Their
whole comment is thus fundamentally in the spirit of the ideas
discussed in my paper.
In my turn, I would like to add to the creative confusion by
discussing several of the issues they have raised. First, Nicolopoulou
and Weintraub state that I have not yet established that 'Potebnya's
work ... had a decisive influence on the formation of the cultural
dimension in Vygotsky's theory' (p. 275; emphasis added). Here, of
course, I would like to know what they mean by 'decisive' and what
evidence would convince them that any influence is 'decisive'. But I do
not want to quibble about words. My aim was to show that the
Humboldt-Potebnya-Shpet tradition was important for Vygotsky's
concept of culture. Let me briefly recall the evidence:
1. Vygotsky read Potebnya in his youth and studied Shpefs ideas in his
student years, that is, before he started his career as a psychologist.
2. Vygotsky mentioned and discussed Potebnya's (and to a lesser extent)
Shpefs ideas throughout his career. Thus, we find abundant references in
his very first books (e.g. Vygotsky, 1925/1971) published when he
entered the academic world, but his interest in this tradition did not
diminish and even in the very last thing he wrote, that is, the last chapter
of Thinking and Speech (Vygotsky, 1934/1987), he referred to Humboldt
and Potebnya in addressing several semiotic themes.
3. In Vygotsky's work we find a number of themes and concepts (listed in
Van der Veer, 1996) which were already present in the work of Humboldt
Potebnya and Shpet, and which, I think, we do not meet in that form in
the work of other theorists (such as Durkheim). These themes and
concepts were of paramount ('decisive'?) importance for Vygotsky's
language-based concept of culture.
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Taken together this evidence doesn't prove that Vygotsky adopted
several of Humboldt's central tenets. After all, he might claim—when
challenged (just like Piaget used to do in similar cases)—that he
independently arrived at these ideas and just referred to Humboldt
and Potebnya because they happened to have stated these same ideas
somewhat earlier, hence my somewhat cautious formulations in my
paper (Van der Veer, 1996). But the whole story at least suggests that
the Humboldt-Potebnya-Shpet tradition was important for Vygots-
ky's whole project, and for his concept of culture. Other researchers,
such as Kozulin (1990), Wertsch (1985) and Yaroshevsky (1989, 1993),
have also emphasized the importance of Potebnya's influence, and all I
did was to spell out this influence in somewhat more detail. In doing
so I fully concurred with Wertsch (1985), who claimed that 'no other
aspect of Vygotsky's work has been as consistently ignored or mis-
interpreted by psychologists as his semiotic analysis and the intellec-
tual forces that gave rise to it' (p. 81).
The second issue raised by Nicolopoulou and Weintraub is that of
the
... two theoretical/ideological alternatives available to Vygotsky. On the
one hand, there is a 'materialist* and technologically reductionist approach
to culture, linked to a hierarchical and unilinear picture of social and
cultural 'progress', represented by Soviet marxism and 'progressive'
thought more generally. On the other hand, there is an 'idealisf and non-
reduchonist understanding of culture and its formative role, linked to a
recognition of cultural diversity, represented by the Humboldtian tradition,
(p. 278)
Nicolopoulou and Weintraub continue by stating that 'this dualistic
picture is a little too neat' (p. 278). I couldn't agree more! 1 never
claimed that Vygotsky had 'two theoretical/ideological alternatives
available' from which he had to chose the right one. Nor did I ever
believe that the notion of progress is exclusively tied to Marxist
thought. What I do believe is that Vygotsky attempted to integrate
different strands of thought, the one consisting of ideas originally
developed by Humboldt, the other developed by Marxist thinkers. It is
a historical fact that this fusion was seen by Vygotsky's contempor-
aries (e.g. Leont'ev's criticism) as lacking a material basis, that is,
Vygotsky's contemporaries still increasingly felt (under the pressure of
the prevailing ideology) that Vygotsky was at bottom an 'idealisf
(Humboldtian) thinker.
I also believe (but here I may be totally wrong) that historically it
were the leftist, Marxist thinkers who put such notions as 'progress'
and 'emancipation' again on the agenda of the social sciences in the
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Soviet Union. What this means is that for Vygotsky, historically, the
Humboldtian tradition yielded important semiotic ideas whereas the
Marxist, 'progressivist' tradition in the Soviet Union (which became
prevalent somewhat later) emphasized such notions as tool-use, mate-
rialism, and technological progress.
This brings me to the final issue raised by Nicolopoulou and
Weintraub, that of individual or cultural development and relativism.
Here they raise an issue which I believe to be of fundamental
importance for psychology. I am not sure though that Nicolopoulou
and Weintraub are right in claiming that 'a thoroughgoing relativism
... is incompatible with any serious conception of development' (p.
282), because here so much depends upon the exact definition of these
terms and concepts.
If we define, for example, developmental or genetic psychology as
the discipline that studies mental development over the whole life-
span, and even if we—as is usual—decide not to view development
beyond adolescence, in both cases we immediately realize that devel-
opment involves both losses and gains. Many of the losses (or
disappearances) are due to the enculturation process in a specific
society: children learn to hide certain feelings, to express others in
conventional forms and the emotions themselves are shaped and
transformed in this process. As a result the emotional 'household' of
adults differs from that of children and from that of adults living in
another culture. Interestingly enough, under some circumstances (e.g.
in psychotherapy) this highly conventionalized emotional behaviour is
felt to be inadequate and persons can be seen as being insufficiently
'genuine' or 'real'. They are then told to shake off the conventional
forms and to express their 'real' feelings more freely or even without
restraint. Such a procedure (which is equally culturally constrained)
presupposes that important mental potentialities were lost during
development. Artists (e.g. painters, sculptors), likewise, often feel
captured in the conventional language of symbols and seek to return to
the allegedly unconventional ways in which children (or 'natives')
express themselves. Of course, all groups find to their dismay that it is
a very difficult if not impossible task to undo the enculturation
process. We can no more 'unlearn' what has been learned, 'unsee'
what has been seen, than we can undo what has been done. Many
thinkers have realized this, hence the romantic pictures of childhood as
a paradise which is irretrievably lost, and so on.
Other losses are due to our organic development: most adults can no
longer suck their big toes, few adults can still be physically active for
more than an hour per day, few elderly people still ride a bike, and so
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on. The well-known graphs of slowly declining intelligence in old age
(if they are more than an artifact) may partially reflect such organic
development (decline).
So development, whether seen as continuing throughout life or
restricted to its first part, entails the appearance (gain) and disap-
pearance (loss) of certain abilities. The fact that some abilities are lost
during development rules out some notions of development. We can no
longer claim, for instance, that in stage B we can do everything we could
do in the previous stage A plus something new; we would have to admit
that in stage B we can no longer perform certain actions which we still
could do in stage A. But perhaps we can still draw a balance and claim
that on the whole adults are somehow 'better', 'more capable', and so
on, than children? Or doesn't such a global statement make any sense?
The presupposition would need to be, of course, that all capacities/
abilities are of equal (or at any rate quantifiable) value and can be added
up in a meaningful way. One would have to say something like: 'OK, I
can no longer make interesting drawings, 1 can no longer play, I can no
longer do physical exercises for more than 15 minutes, I can no longer
cry in public, but 1 can do arithmetic and I did learn to speak passable
French, so all in all I have made some global progress.' But here it
becomes obvious that such global statements are very problematic, that
we cannot meaningfully balance the losses against the gains as we lack a
common standard or unit to compare them. It may also be that such
global statements reflect a western-type form of 'ageism' in which both
children and elderly people are seen as inferior variants of the adult
person who is typically doing and publishing the scientific research.
Thus, it would seem that development (i.e. we can do other/more
things than previously, but we lost some of our previous abilities)
doesn't necessarily involve 'progress' (i.e. we can do something faster/
more accurately, etc., than previously; we can do what we could do
previously plus something more) and may be compatible with what I
would call RELATIVISM A. RELATIVISM A entails the position that we
can never state that any new stage in development is on the whole better
than any (previous) stage, as there are no global standards and as
summation of developments in different developmental domains (or
lines of development) is impossible. I would object, however, to
accepting what I call RELATIVISM B, by which I mean a form of
relativism which says that we have no grounds at all for saying that
something is better than anything else.
Surely one can make comparative statements about specific pro-
cesses provided we specify our standards for comparison. Thus, to
give a trivial example, we might say that cars are 'better' than bikes if
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our goal is to reach some far-away place as fast as possible, whereas
we might claim that bikes are 'better' than cars if our goal is to
diminish environmental pollution. I think that for both ontogenetic
development and cultural development (comparing cultures of dif-
ferent societies) we can accept RELATIVISM A (and thus deny value of
making statements about global progress, while recognizing local
contrasts) and reject RELATIVISM B (in its denial of any comparisons).
Thus it is possible to accept that different stages or cultures have
specific advantages and disadvantages, without becoming involved in
general claims about progress, regress or stagnation in general.
The above remarks were meant to reflect on our use of such notions
as development and relativism in the domain of ontogenetic (and to
some extent cultural) development. But, clearly, similar problems exist
in other domains as well. Some biologists have claimed, for example,
that there is no sense in which we can argue that global progress has
been made during biological evolution while others subscribe to some
form of the Great Chain of Being (see elaborate discussions in
Dennett, 1995). What this means is that 1 agree with Nicolopoulou and
Weintraub that theoretical work in this area is extremely important
for (developmental) psychology in general and for our assessment of
the specific theories advanced by Piaget, Kohlberg, Vygotsky and
others.
Finally, let me thank Nicolopoulou and Weintraub for their con-
structive criticisms which helped me to clarify my own thinking and to
realize what I had originally written. It is by means of such criticisms
that science can develop (make progress?), or as the German saying
goes: 'Sour grapes make sweet wine.' (Saure Weintrauben machen
susse Wein.)
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